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Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 86, 124 P.3d 191 (2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW – COCONSPIRATOR LIABILITY
Summary
The State of Nevada successfully prosecuted Anthony Thomas Bolden, Appellant,
for burglary, home invasion, first-degree kidnapping, second-degree kidnapping, robbery,
and conspiracy to commit robbery and/ or kidnapping. The charges resulted from an
incident in which Bolden and four other masked men broke into an apartment looking for
drugs and money. The State advanced three alternative theories of Bolden’s guilt: direct
participation, aiding and abetting, and vicarious coconspirator liability. The jury returned
a general guilty verdict in response, which means that it did not specify on which theory
it based its verdict.
Bolden filed an appeal, alleging error during jury selection under Batson v.
Kentucky,2 and contended that the State failed to present sufficient evidence. The Nevada
Supreme Court determined that the State justified its juror challenges on raceindependent grounds and that the Batson challenge was without merit. While the court
rejected Bolden’s specific claims with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence
argument, it determined that the jury instruction regarding vicarious coconspirator
liability was improper.
The court concluded that Bolden’s conviction under the theories of direct
participation and aiding and abetting were legally and factually sufficient, the improper
jury instruction made a conviction under the vicarious coconspirator theory faulty.
Issues
1.
The primary issue is what standard should be required to convict a
coconspirator of a specific intent crime.
2.
The second issue is whether a general jury verdict can stand when it could
have been based on either a legally valid or invalid ground.
Disposition
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed Bolden’s conviction for the specific intent
crimes of burglary and first and second-degree kidnapping and remanded on those
counts. The court affirmed Bolden’s convictions for the remaining counts.
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Issue 1
State of the Law Before Bolden v. State
The “natural and probable consequences” doctrine holds criminal conspirators
liable for acts of coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and that
follow as a natural or probable consequence of the unlawful agreement.3 Mere
foreseeability of the related crime is insufficient to meet the natural and probable
consequences standard.4 Rather, the State must show some specific intent or knowledge
of the charged crime.5 Sharma v. State6 overruled Garner in that the court held that a
defendant may not be convicted under an aiding and abetting theory absent proof of
specific intent to aid the other conspirator.
To convict a defendant of a general intent crime, the defendant need not have
intended the precise harm or result. General intent is “the intent to do that which the law
prohibits.” Conversely, specific intent is “the intent to accomplish the precise act which
the law prohibits.” Thus, specific intent crimes require proof that the defendant
possessed the state of mind required by the statutory definition of the crime. The Sharma
court ultimately concluded that the natural and probable consequences doctrine should
not be applied to specific intent crimes because it allows a defendant to be convicted for a
crime even if he lacked the statutorily required intent. In the present case, the Nevada
Supreme Court notes that Sharma addressed the doctrine as applied only to principal
liability for aiding and abetting.
Bolden v. State addresses a question left previously unanswered by Garner and
Sharma: whether a theory of vicarious coconspirator liability based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine is a legally viable theory in Nevada.
The concern presented by the “natural and probable consequences doctrine” and its effect
on vicarious coconspirator liability, as intimated above, is that it allows a defendant to be
convicted of a specific intent crime even though he did not possess the statutorily
required intent for the offense.
The United States Supreme Court defined coconspirator liability in terms of
reasonable foreseeability in Pinkerton v. United States.7 However, Pinkerton has been
extensively criticized and Nevada has not adopted the Pinkerton rule. The Nevada
Supreme Court agrees with the criticism that Pinkerton excessively broadens conspiracy
liability and notes that many other jurisdictions, such as Washington, New Mexico,
Arizona, and New York have explicitly declined to adopt the rule.

3

Garner v. State, 116 Nev. 770, 779 6 P.3d 1013, 1019 (2000), overruled in part by Sharma v. State, 118
Nev. 648, 56 P.3d 868 (2002).
4
Id. at 782, 6 P.3d at 1021.
5
Id.
6
118 Nev. 648, 655, 56 P.3d 868, 872 (2002).
7
328 U.S. 640 (1946).

2

Other Jurisdictions
States are divided in their application of the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to criminal defendants. For instance, New Mexico has rejected similar use of the
doctrine.8 However, several other jurisdictions have recently affirmed the doctrine as an
established component of common law.9
Effect of Bolden v. State on Current Law
In Bolden v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court rejects the natural and probable
consequences doctrine for coconspirator liability regarding specific intent crimes. It
extends Sharma to include vicarious coconspirator liability. “[A] defendant may not be
held criminally liable for the specific intent crime committed by a coconspirator simply
because that crime was a natural and probable consequence of the object of the
conspiracy.” To convict a defendant of a specific intent crime, the State must show that
the defendant possessed the requisite statutory intent. The Court limited its holding to
vicarious coconspirator liability based on the natural and probable consequences for
specific intent crime; the holding does not extend to general intent crimes.
Unanswered Questions
Though the court explicitly limited its holding as applying only to specific intent
crimes, it “cautioned” the State that it will consider the doctrine’s applicability to general
intent crimes in the future if the theory of liability for crimes has too attenuated a
connection from the conspiracy.
Issue 2
The jury in Bolden v. State had delivered a general verdict in response to the
prosecution’s three alternative theories. This is acceptable if each of the presented
alternative theories is legally valid. However, the general rule is that if one or more
theories is legally invalid, the verdict cannot stand because a reviewing court cannot
know on what ground the jury based its verdict. In the present case, the Nevada Supreme
Court adopts the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ exception to the general rule from
Keating v. Hood10 in holding that reversal of the verdict may not be required if it is
“absolutely certain” that the jury relied on the legally correct theory to convict the
defendant in cases such as this – where the general verdict could have been based on
either a legally valid or invalid ground.
Here, the Court was unable to conclude with absolute certainty that the jury relied
on one of the legally valid grounds. Accordingly, the Court reversed the convictions on
the specific intent crimes (burglary, first-degree kidnapping, and second-degree
kidnapping).
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Conclusion
Bolden v. State extends Sharma v. State by declining to apply the natural and
probable consequences doctrine to vicarious coconspirator liability for specific intent
crimes. In doing so, it also cautioned prosecutors against taking this holding as license to
overzealously apply the doctrine to general intent crimes. In addition, the Nevada
Supreme Court adopts a narrow exception to the invalidity of general verdicts when one
or more grounds is legally invalid. A general verdict may stand, even if one theory is
legally invalid if the court can be “absolutely certain” the jury based its verdict on a
legally valid basis.
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